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Testing A Theoretical Model of  Mortgage Demand on United Kingdom Data
Abstract 
Mortgage demand is a little understood and under researched aspect of the financial 
behaviour of households. This paper empirically tests the basic results of Brueckner’s model 
of mortgage demand (Brueckner, 1994) on United Kingdom mortgage market data. The 
choice of mortgage instrument is used to identify impatient debt maximisers and patient 
borrowers who borrow at intermediate levels. Thus the research confirms the conditions 
under which households will use the largest possible mortgage and the circumstances under 
which savings are invested in the property. A unique contribution of the work is the estimation 
of mortgage demand equations corrected for endogenous housing demand, for a single 
housing finance system, where borrows face different opportunity costs of equity in their 
owner occupied property, allowing a purer test of the theoretical model.  
Introduction 
Mortgage demand is an important financial choice of households that is not yet fully understood. 
Brueckner (1994) has deduced some basic theoretical results for mortgage demand, under certainty and 
uncertainty, and drawn out their implications for econometric estimation. His work demonstrated the 
critical nature of the interest rate regime, that is the relative magnitudes of the net of tax mortgage 
interest rate and the net of tax savings rate (also see Alm and Follain, 1987). The research also 
emphasised the need to correct for the endogeneity of housing demand in mortgage demand equations. 
An argument of this paper is that the choice of mortgage instrument provides the basis for estimating 
mortgage demand equations for groups of borrowers who face a different relationship between the 
opportunity cost of equity in their property and the net of tax mortgage interest rate. This produces the 
conditions for testing the qualitative predictions of Brueckner’s model with uncertainty, for example 
the circumstances under which households maximise debt. The theoretical predictions differ according 
to the interest rate regime, in this case as it varies between households.  
Understanding the determinants of mortgage demand is important for both the evaluation of monetary 
and fiscal policy and rigorous housing and mortgage market analysis. Mortgage debt has significant 
implications for the economic welfare of individuals and their life opportunities (see Leece 2004). The 
paper builds on previous work that compares the mortgage demand of endowment and repayment 
mortgage holders (Leece, 1995, 2000, 2001). It significantly extends that research in two ways. Firstly, 
the comparison of mortgage demand equations is used to test Brueckners 1994 mortgage demand 
model. Previous research, published in this journal (Leece, 1995, 2000) and elsewhere (Leece, 2001), 
has not been guided by an explicit theoretical model of mortgage demand. A true test of the basic 
results of such a mortgage demand model requires observed variations in the relationship between net 
borrowing costs and the net foregone return on financial savings. This paper argues that a comparative 
study of the mortgage demand of endowment and annuity mortgage holders provides this variation and 
is thus a true empirical test of this specific mortgage demand model.  
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Secondly, the research reports the results of testing for the simultaneity of mortgage and housing 
demand in primarily cross section data. This simultaneity has been tested for and detected in US work 
(see Ling and McGill, 1998), but it has been neglected in previous UK mortgage demand estimation 
(for example, Devereaux and Lanot, 2004). In the papers previously published in Applied Economics 
Leece has tested for the simultaneity of mortgage demand and the choice of mortgage instrument but 
not for the endogeneity of housing demand. More recent work, has partially addressed this issue (see 
Leece 2004) but for endowment mortgage holders only, thus foregoing a comparative estimate of the 
mortgage demand model and accompanying specification tests when opportunity cost of equity in 
property might vary by household and be reflected in the choice of mortgage instrument. 
Estimating mortgage demand for households that face different comparative costs within a single 
housing finance system overcomes a number of difficulties. The theoretical model can be tested with 
respect to a shared menu of mortgage contract choices, and a given fiscal and regulatory framework. 
The exercise also reflects upon the validity of aggregating mortgage demand in time series studies of 
national markets. Different opportunity cost of equity within a single housing finance system are likely 
to correspond with some form of market segmentation or selectivity, or be associated with other 
features of borrowing such as liquidity constraints. If appropriate segmentation is signalled by the 
choice of mortgage contract (e.g. borrower impatience), joint borrowing and savings outcomes 
predicted by Brueckner’s model can be empirically evaluated. The research reported in this paper 
considers households, which maximise debt, and borrowers who have intermediate levels of borrowing.  
The estimation of mortgage demand equations by mortgage type, using UK data, has been reported 
elsewhere (Leece, 2000 b; Leece, 2004; Devereaux and Lanot, 2004). The work reported here extends 
previous research by controlling for endogenously determined housing demand, and analysing the debt 
maximising behaviour of annuity (repayment) mortgage holders. The research also covers a more 
recent period, 1990-1994, compared to previous work – e.g. 1985 to 1989 in the case of Devereaux and 
Lanot, 2004). 1An additional interest is the joint borrowing and saving decision evident in the choice of 
an endowment mortgage. Leece (2000 b) has indicated the information content in the choice between 
the endowment and the annuity mortgage and those ideas are extended here. The research reports 
estimates of mortgage demand equations for two types of mortgage holder, endowment and repayment. 
The expectation is that the savings and borrowing decisions of households within these two groups will 
correspond with important subsets of behaviour predicted in Brueckner’s model. 
The repayment mortgage is a conventional annuity mortgage with a level payment combining interest 
and repayment of principal. The repayment mortgage can have a variable term, and thus affords some 
flexibility in the rate of amortisation (Leece, 1997). The endowment mortgage is an interest only (or 
balloon) mortgage with accompanying contractual payments into an investment fund. For popular ‘with 
profits endowment policies’ it was expected that on maturity the sum accrued would exceed the 
 
1 United States research concerns credit rationed or liquidity constrained groups (Linnemann and Wachter, 1989, 
Follain and Dunsky, 1997). 
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nominal value of the mortgage debt. Thus endowment mortgages are a joint housing finance/financial 
savings decision2. Most previous research on UK endowment mortgages has been concerned with the 
valuation of the option to default (Chinloy, 1995; Pereira et al, 2003). Research relevant here concerns 
the choice between an endowment and a repayment mortgage (Leece, 1995 b).  Endowment mortgage 
holders are argued to have a high foregone rate of return on savings. High opportunity costs of equity 
in property, ceterus paribus, leads to lower rates of amortisation of debt (see Plaut, 1985), with the 
limit being zero amortisation and the balloon mortgage. This and other characteristics of the two types 
of debt are used to predict the expected behaviour of mortgage holders.  
The data comes from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a rich source that has observations 
dating from 1991. The demand equations were estimated for the period 1991 to 1994. There are later 
panels of data available, but these were not used. Post 1994 the UK mortgage market became 
increasingly complex in the choices available, with heavy discounting (teaser rates), and a greater 
variety of cash back (front loaded payments), fixed rate or capped deals. This complexity is of great 
interest but creates difficulties for aggregating mortgage types and determining mortgage type within 
the BHPS. The relationship between net of tax mortgage rates and opportunity cost of equity becomes 
more ambiguous and difficult to establish. Noise is also evident in the growing dissatisfaction with the 
performance of endowment mortgages3. Thus the period 1990 to 1994 provides a window for the 
comparison of estimates of mortgage demand classified by mortgage choice, suggested here. One 
difficulty is that the panel does not cover a full interest rate cycle, though there is significant and non-
trending variation in the premium charged on fixed rate debt (see Leece, 2000 a, 2001 a).  
The first section of the paper presents the theoretical background to the research. This includes the 
basic results of mortgage demand presented by Brueckner (1994), and a discussion of the basis of 
choice between a repayment and an endowment mortgage. The sample and estimation issues are 
discussed in the subsequent section, followed by a discussion of results. Brueckner addresses some key 
questions. Under what circumstances will households have the largest possible mortgage? When will 
households use existing assets to reduce the size of any mortgage? When will households rely 
exclusively on savings to finance the purchase of a property? The first two of these questions are 
addressed empirically in this paper. The results confirm that impatient borrowers facing a low 
opportunity cost of equity will exhibit maximum borrowing. The results also suggest that households 
with lower levels of impatience and high opportunity cost of equity will have intermediate levels of 
borrowing combined with saving in an alternative investment to housing. Given that under uncertainty 
the signs on variables in the latter case are ambiguous then the parameter estimates are of further 
interest. 
 
2 It might be argued that only payments over and above the amount expected to secure debt repayment is saving. 
While this does not materially effect the analysis the endowment holder is still making a savings decision in regard 
to the repayment of the debt. 
3 There are a number of serious issues concerning  information asymmetry and agency problems in the endowment 
market, with accusations of mis-selling and accompanying financial scandals. These issues are not discussed in 
this paper. The critical point is that households holding an endowment expected a rate of return in excess of the net 
of tax mortgage interest rate. 
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Brueckner’s Basic Results 
The econometric specification reported in this paper is derived from the basic results of mortgage 
demand established by Brueckner (1994). That model demonstrates the effects on the comparative 
static’s of a mortgage demand equation of differences in interest rate regimes. The modelling covers 
conditions of certainty and uncertainty. The uncertainty model allows variance in the rate of return on 
financial savings. Certainty models can usefully inform econometric specification, but it is likely that 
households making joint mortgage and investment choices will operate under uncertainty. In this case 
the comparative static’s are ambiguous. However, the model has some important qualitative results 
relating to circumstances under which mortgage debt will be maximised, and when it will be combined 
with financial saving and investment. These qualitative results provide the focus for this paper. 
This section of the paper presents the basic framework of Brueckner’s model. This is a two period 
model. Households simultaneously determine housing h , mortgage demand m and levels of saving 
s . Decisions on saving and the allocation of expenditure between housing and a numeraire 
commodity x effect future (second period) wealth, from which utility is also derived. The household’s 
objective function, equation 1, is the combined utility function and budget constraint. In this equation 
household utility U is a function of non housing consumption x (eliminated by substitution of the 
budget constraint for x in U), housing, and wealth which originates from interest on savings sr , income 
y , the value of property ph less the final balloon payment and interest due on the mortgage 
mrm )1( + . Future utility of wealth V is discounted by the borrowers rate of time preference  .
Households face several borrowing constraints. Borrowing for purposes other than the purchase of a  
property is precluded, and therefore savings must be positive or zero )0( s indicating a liquidity 
constraint. Mortgage borrowing must be less than the exogenously given maximum loan to value ratio 
)( mph  indicating some potential mortgage credit rationing. Also, the mortgage must be greater 
than zero )0( >m so that households cannot issue their own mortgage debt. Given these reasonable 
restrictions then optimising (1) yields Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for s , m and h .
Of course in a perfectly competitive market, with equal interest rates on borrowing and saving, then the 
household would be indifferent between the use of saving or mortgage borrowing in shifting wealth 
between periods. The model precludes this possibility by restricting mortgage borrowing to the first 
period, and limiting this to the finance of housing4. There is also a critical assumption of differences in 
borrowing and lending rates driven primarily by the possibility of the different tax treatment of the 
mortgage interest rate and the rate of return on the appropriate savings vehicle. In the United Kingdom 
for example returns on endowment mortgage investment funds were tax-free. Arguments presented 
 
4 See Brueckner (1994) p. 252 for a discussion of these assumptions. 
(1) ])1()1([]),([ mrphsryVhmphswU ms +++++ 
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later in this paper suggest that differential opportunity costs of borrowing can emerge because 
borrowers have different alternative financial investments to housing, and that this difference in the 
relevant savings vehicle is reflected in the choice of mortgage instrument. 
Note that the three sets of optimal results represent the simultaneous determination of the level of 
housing services, savings and mortgage size, and this is critical to the econometric estimation reported 
later5. However, we follow Brueckner (1994) in combining the optimality conditions for just s and 
m and holding h constant6. This then focuses upon the choice between the mortgage and savings and 
facilitates an analysis of the impact of different interest rate regimes. 
The key equation is equation (2), which is derived from a combination of the first order conditions for 
s and m , with h assumed exogenously given. The arguments µ	 ,,( ) in equation (2) are the 
respective multipliers. The equality represents optimum combinations of saving and mortgage debt. For 
a given relationship between sr and mr the required comparative sizes of the multipliers and thus 
borrowing behaviour can be derived. For example, given that the multipliers cannot be negative then in 
the case of ms rr > , and with certainty, debt must be maximised7.
The key feature of equation (2) is the importance of the interest rate regime. There are several subsets 
of possible behaviour when the values of sr and mr are known with certainty. The rate of time 
preference or degree of impatience  plays a key role in delineating these behaviours. When the 
mortgage rate is less than the savings rate borrowers will maximise their debt. When the mortgage rate 
is higher than the rate of return on savings then the outcome depends upon the degree of impatience. 
Highly impatient borrowers will still maximise debt but they will have zero financial savings, though in 
practice such households may demand some liquidity. Borrowers with intermediate levels of 
impatience will borrow less than the maximum value and have zero financial savings. Very patient 
households will have positive financial savings but zero mortgage debt. The certainty model yields 
comparative static results which can inform the specification of a mortgage demand equation. In the 
cases where the loan to value ratio binds then comparative static effects are zero on all variables except 
h which can be increased to overcome this constraint. Other than this case mortgage demand is a 
positive function of housing and income and a negative function of initial wealth and the borrowers 
discount rate.  
The complications in mapping the theory onto empirical specification arise in the case when sr and 
 
5 The optimality equation for housing is given by  0=+=+ µ pVpUpU hx where p is the 
price per unit of housing services. So housing is a choice variable which will require the use of 
instrumental variables in the estimation of the mortgage demand equations. 
6 See Brueckner (1994, p. 254). 
7 See Brueckner (1994, pp. 254-255). 
(2) )1()1( µ	 ++=++ VrVr ms
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mr have uncertain values. The modified version of equation (2) is presented below as equation (3) and 
now includes the appropriate integrals and probability density functions ( ), when sr is uncertain8.
With uncertainty and when ms rr > borrowers may no longer maximise debt but rather both borrow 
and save in a financial asset. It is this additional possibility that leads to the ambiguity of expected 
signs on variables. In the case where ms rr < then the subsets of behaviour correspond to those under 
certainty. That is impatient borrowers will maximise debt and have zero financial savings, less 
impatient borrowers will have intermediate levels of debt with no financial savings, and patient 
borrowers will have no debt with positive savings in an alternative asset to property.  
µ	 ++=++  mmss drVrdrVr )1()1( (3) 
Given the possible importance of house price uncertainty for mortgage demand then equation (3) can 
be extended to include a third integral, and probability density function, to represent house price 
uncertainty. Brueckner (1994) conducts this exercise and concludes that this makes no difference to the 
theoretical predictions of the model of mortgage demand under uncertainty, that is the conditions under 
which debt maximisation, minimisation or intermediate borrowing take place remain the same9.
The econometric estimation reported in this paper attempts to detect two major subsets of predicted 
borrowing behaviour under uncertainty. These are the impatient debt maximisers for whom ms rr <
(subset 1) and the fairly patient borrowers who have joint financial savings and borrowing and face 
ms rr > (subset 2). This paper argues that self selection in the UK mortgage contract market results in 
a sorting of borrowers into these two groups by patience and thus allows a test of the qualitative 
predictions of the model, that is conditions under which debt maximisation takes place and conditions 
where borrowers make a contribution to the equity in their property and save in an alternative financial 
asset. Of the remaining predicted types of behaviour when ms rr < zero borrowing is excluded from 
the empirical analysis while intermediate borrowers with no saving in an alternative financial asset 
might be detected within repayment mortgage holders (the endowment requiring compulsory saving in 
a financial investment). Intermediate mortgage borrowers with no saving are empirically identified 
among repayment mortgage holders by having short durations of debt, which are indicative of a lack of 
debt maximisation with respect to time. 
The Behavioural Basis of the Selection of an Endowment Mortgage 
This section of the paper offers a brief review of the literature on the choice between an endowment 
and a repayment mortgage (Leece, 1995, 2000 a, 2000 b, 2004; Devereaux and Lanot, 2004). Previous 
 
8 Brueckner tests for an uncertain mr which is more applicable to Canada than the USA and is also 
relevant to the UK mortgage market with its dominance of variable rate debt. This made no difference 
to the conclusions of the analysis. 
9 See Brueckner (1994) page 259. 
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research suggests the determinants of contract choice and the likelihood of any related selectivity bias 
in the estimation of mortgage demand equations. Devereaux and Lanot demonstrate that in a world of 
certainty, and with no preferential tax treatment, borrowers will be indifferent between the two types of 
mortgage. When the return on the investment fund is uncertain the choice reflects a separating 
equilibrium, with more risk averse borrowers adopting the repayment mortgage. A subsidy on 
mortgage interest payments induces the marginal borrower to switch so that some risk averse 
borrowers adopt the endowment.  A decline in the subsidy would lead to a reduction in demand for the 
endowment mortgage but a separating equilibrium might remain. 
Leece (1995, 2000 a) offers a different perspective based upon the non-price features of UK mortgage 
contracts. For example, the repayment mortgage can vary in term and facilitates flexible amortisation 
scheduling. In addition, the repayment mortgage is prepaid on moving to a new property, while the 
endowment mortgage is transferable. Prepayment means that repayment mortgage holders can take out 
a new loan using the same term (typically 25 years) reducing the rate of amortisation of their debt and 
effectively maximising their holding of housing debt with respect to time. This feature, along with 
repayment flexibility, may be attractive to liquidity constrained and/or impatient borrowers, or 
households facing capital market imperfections and incomplete portfolios (Leece, 2004). Thus there is 
an alternative basis for a separating equilibrium to that suggested by Devereaux and Lanot. Impatient 
borrowers may be concentrated among repayment mortgage holders. 
There is empirical evidence for the importance of liquidity constraints and capital market imperfections 
for mortgage choice. Devereaux and Lanot estimate a discrete choice model of choice of mortgage 
instrument to be used as a correction for selectivity in disaggregated mortgage demand equations. The 
results suggested that either risk aversion or liquidity constraints provides the basis of choice, together 
with the relative cost of the two mortgage instruments. Leece (1995, 2000a) also finds evidence of 
liquidity and affordability concerns driving the choice of mortgage type. Moreover, the estimated 
mortgage demand equations demonstrate that repayment mortgage holders behave like a liquidity-
constrained group of borrowers. A common finding in all the research is that there is no selectivity bias 
in mortgage demand estimation arising from the choice of mortgage instrument.  
A choice equation was estimated for the purposes of testing for selectivity bias in the mortgage demand 
equations. The results of this estimation can be found in Table A1 in Appendix A. The overall equation 
is not statistically significant though the mortgage interest rate argument is significant and positive in 
sign. Endowment performance is positively related to the level of interest rates and so this result may 
reflect this effect. At the margin some borrowers are attracted by higher endowment performance as 
suggested by Devereaux and Lanot. There is no observable price effect (that is negative interest rate 
effect) to indicate the degree of substitutability between the two contracts. Also, there was no evidence 
of selectivity bias in the estimation of the disaggregated mortgage demand equations. Taken together 
with low explanatory value there is little evidence that the choices are close substitutes. The markets 
may be segmented and reflect unobservable preferences of borrowers that correlate with constant non-
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9
price contractual features10. For example a desire to maximise debt with respect to time by impatient or 
liquidity-constrained borrowers that would render the repayment mortgage more suitable. 
An important consideration is the effect of the subsidy on mortgage interest payments. According to 
Devereaux and Lanot (2004) this subsidy has the effect of inducing risk averse borrowers to take up the 
endowment mortgage. Several empirical features suggest that this subsidy may no longer have been 
large during the 1990s, and that the benefits of the subsidy arising out of the endowment choice were 
largely captured by lenders (Devereaux and Lanot, 2004). The standard rate of tax was reduced, as was 
the amount of interest rate subsidy allowed. Moreover, maintaining the upper threshold of borrowing 
eligible for relief in nominal terms led to a decline in the real value of this subsidy11. The cost 
differences between endowment and repayment mortgages have not been large suggesting that lenders 
captured some of the tax relief. More formal econometric analysis by Devereaux and Lanot suggests 
that this capture was indeed the case. Thus the major factor influencing the choice of the endowment 
mortgage was likely to be the expected rate of return on the endowment fund. This is consistent with 
the estimates of the selection equation for this paper, which nether the less shows this effect not to be 
large. Endowment and repayment mortgages may not have been viewed as close substitutes. 
This paper argues that the mortgage demand of repayment mortgage holders reflects that of impatient 
borrowers who value the facility to defer the repayment of capital. Conversely, the mortgage demand 
of endowment mortgage holders will reflect the behaviour of more patient borrowers who combine 
ownership of property with investment in an alternative financial asset and do not follow a debt 
maximising rule. However, to map mortgage demand onto the qualitative results of Brueckner’s model 
we also need to establish the likelihood that borrowers face different opportunity costs of equity in their 
property. For example, in the case of ms rr > patient borrowers will forego debt maximisation and 
save in an alternative financial asset but if ms rr < then no such saving should be evident 
Endowment holders expect that the rate of return on their financial investment will exceed the 
mortgage interest rate, that is ms rr > . There is an expectation of a capital sum on maturity that 
exceeds the outstanding balance and so the endowment is also perceived as a savings vehicle. Flexible 
amortisation would suggest that the repayment mortgage has value for liquidity-constrained households 
and/or those with incomplete portfolios (Leece, 1995, 2000 a; Plaut, 1986; Goodman and Wassmer, 
1992; Brueckner, 1984). Such households are likely to value liquidity and have a lower opportunity 
cost of equity in their property (Leece, 1995). Thus there are now two regimes, one with a 
comparatively low opportunity cost of equity combined with the possibility to defer capital repayments 
of interest to impatient borrowers. The other a high opportunity cost of equity regime with inflexible 
 
10 For example, if impatience does not vary with borrower characteristics that influence choice and the 
characteristics of contracts do not change, and contract features correlate with the unobservable borrower 
impatience then this will reduce the elasticity of substitution with respect to price between the contracts. The given 
contractual features are discrete (for example term can be adjusted or it cannot) and are not used as non-price 
features which can vary to achieve market equilibrium. Thus market segmentation is expected in this case. 
11 Devereaux and Lanot note a reduced aggregate cost to the Inland Revenue from £7.7 billion in 190/91 fell to 
£3.5 billion by 1994/1995. 
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amortisation scheduling but with the accumulation of financial capital to meet the debt and attracting 
more patient borrowers.  It is possible that savers in financial assets could be indifferent between the 
two contracts, take out a repayment mortgage and invest elsewhere, and so for those households 
ms rr > . In this case we adopt the usual assumption of separating equilibrium where a borrower 
indifferent to two choices will adopt the choice compatible with the separating equilibrium. There 
might also be lower transactions costs from packaging the investment fund and the mortgage, which 
would reinforce this division of borrowers. 
The Empirical Specification of the Mortgage Demand Models 
The econometric estimation involves two dependent variables, the real mortgage balance *M and the 
loan to value ratio lv , both measured at origination. There are good reasons in the case of the UK 
housing market to use measures of mortgage debt measured at origination (see Leece, 2004). Firstly, 
this eases comparison with other UK studies (Devereaux and Lanot, 2004) where the data set 
constrains the dependent variable to be new mortgages (BSA data). Secondly, given prepayment 
penalties in the UK then there can be large divergences between desired and actual mortgage balances 
and thus the actual and market value of debt; such discrepancies are minimised at the point of adoption. 
Each of these equations will be separately estimated for endowment and repayment mortgage holders. 
The coefficients on all variables except housing and the constant term are restricted to be the same for 
estimates involving both dependent variables (that is the use of an instrument effectively controls for 
variations in housing expenditure evident in the denominator of the loan to value ratio). There are 
different expectations regarding the effects of housing expenditure on the loan to value ratio in the case 
of debt maxi misers, to be discussed below. The general specification of the mortgage demand equation 
is given by expression (4). The model is expressed in terms of natural logarithms. 
The econometric specification follows Brueckner (1994) in that the focus is upon the endogeneity of 
housing demand and mortgage demand under different interest rate regimes, reflected here by the 
choice of mortgage instrument. The remaining arguments in the empirical estimation reflect those 
variables typically expected to impact on housing/mortgage demand and found in previous UK 
estimations (see Leece, 1995, 2000, 2001). Thus mortgage demand is taken to be a function of a 
constant term ( a ), age ( A ), the net of tax mortgage interest rate ( mr ), the premium on fixed rate debt  
( pr ), the discrepancy between savings and mortgage loan rates ( ms rr  ), income ( I ), an instrument 
for housing expenditure ( IH ), lagged values of house price inflation ( hp )and a vector of 
personal/household characteristics (V ).   
),,,,,,,,ln()ln( * VpHIrrrrAaM hImspm = (4) 
The variable names for the empirical counterparts to these theoretical variables are mostly designed to 
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be self-explanatory and are presented as descriptions in Tables of results. Note that the interest rate is 
the average nominal mortgage interest rate net of standard rate tax adjusted for any changes in this tax 
during the period of study. Income relates to gross annual household income. House price inflation is 
measured by changes in the Department of Environment annual house price index. Though house price 
volatility may impact upon mortgage demand the main focus of econometric estimation in this paper is 
the cross section analysis. The span of time for time varying effects is just four years, and is a period of 
continuously declining house prices; therefore house price volatility is assumed constant in this model. 
In addition the first order conditions in the theoretical model do not suggest any unique role for house 
price volatility. 
The previously discussed theory offers the following predictions regarding the behaviour of the two 
types of mortgage holder.  
• Annuity mortgage holders are impatient debt maximisers who face ms rr < . This implies zero 
saving in an alternative asset to housing and zero coefficients in the mortgage balance 
equation, other than for endogenously determined housing demand ( 0
*
>


IH
M ), as is the case 
under certainty. 
• Endowment mortgage holders are savers and with a risky investment are less likely to be debt 
maximisers, despite ms rr > . The coefficients on explanatory variables remain ambiguous in 
sign and their determination is of interest. For example, 0
*



IH
M or 0
*
>


IH
M can hold. 
• That in the case of debt maxi misers there is no systematic relationship between the demand 
for housing and the observed loan to value ratio ( 0
*
=


IH
lv ). The loan to value ratio provides 
an absolute constraint. Increased housing demand merely raises absolute levels of borrowing 
to overcome this constraint.  
• That for borrowers facing ms rr > (endowment holders) and adopting an intermediate level 
of borrowing there is the possibility of a systematic relationship between the demand for 
housing and the loan to value ratio, though with uncertainty the expected sign on housing 
expenditure in such an equation is ambiguous ( 0
*



IH
lv  or 0
*
<


IH
lv ). 
In summary, the UK mortgage market during the sample period had two mortgage instruments, which 
attracted different types of borrower facing exogenously given differences in the opportunity cost of 
equity in housing. The existence of low opportunity cost of equity induces maximising behaviour and 
zero saving when those borrowers are impatient. Contractual features mean that such impatient 
borrowers are likely to be found among annuity mortgage holders. Endowment mortgage holders will 
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be joint borrowers and investors most likely to borrow at intermediate levels. These predictions 
conform to the subsets of behaviour identified in the mortgage demand model of Brueckner (1994). 
The remainder of the paper discusses the estimation of mortgage demand equations for these two 
groups. 
Sample and Estimation Issues 
The sample is 760 mortgage holders drawn from the British Household Panel Survey (1990 to 1994). 
The period does suffer from generally high mortgage interest rates and thus the sample has less interest 
rate variability than might be desired. However, there is variation in the cost of fixed rate mortgage 
debt, which was an important innovation for the United Kingdom market at that time (see Leece, 1995; 
2001). Also a fall in tax relief in mortgage interest rates in April 1993 adds a significant source of 
variation. There are several important reasons for limiting the empirical analysis to this time frame. The 
chosen window precedes the increasing complexity of mortgage offers during periods of heavy 
discounting post 1994. It is also a time period during which concerns with the agency problems in 
endowment mortgage selling had not yet reached its height; endowments were still 57% of all new 
mortgages between 1990 to 1994, with repayment mortgages 34%12. There was a radical move out of 
endowment mortgage debt post 1994, for example they were only 21% of new mortgage loans by 
1999. Prepayment of mortgage debt was also discouraged by heavy penalties and so this aspect of 
mortgage demand would also be absent. Th se features mean that the choice of study period provides 
critical controls that facilitate the estimation of the basic mortgage demand model.  
The typical estimation technique used in the US literature is the simultaneous Tobit modelling housing 
and mortgage demand (Ling and McGill, 1998; Follain and Dunsky, 1997). This controls for zero 
observations in the dependent variable, when zero mortgage holders are observed among owner-
occupiers. The model estimated here differs in that a standard two stage least squares regression is 
used. The sample considers mortgage debt at the point of house purchase. Movers are more likely to 
incur some mortgage debt so zero debt is less likely. An exception would be those in retirement who 
trade down properties but these are likely to be a small proportion of this sample. Interestingly 
endowment mortgages are transferable and follow the household between housing moves. Also, the 
endowment mortgage choice implies a desire to maintain debt to maturity so that observing zero debt is 
not likely until much later stages of the lifecycle. The tendency for repayment mortgage holders to 
extend maturity has also been noted. Finally, there is a problem in identifying which households that 
have paid off their mortgage debt would have held an endowment mortgage. 
There is significant regional variation in house price inflation in the UK and this is expected to 
influence housing demand more than mortgage demand and gearing13. Experimentation proved this to 
be the case and regional location was used to identify the equation estimating the instrument for 
housing demand. The housing demand equation also contains proxies for the user cost of owner 
 
12 Housing Statistics Summary, 2003, Number 17, Table 1.1, p. 2. (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister). 
13 Brueckner re-appraises his model for variations in the rate of house price inflation and finds no significantly 
different effects. 
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occupation, which is nominal interest rates and lagged values of house price inflation. Changes in the 
subsidy of mortgage interest rates is recognised by the adjustment of the relevant monthly mortgage 
interest rate. Interestingly, the lagged value of house price inflation or alternative measures of this 
component of user costs has no statistically significant effect on housing demand, a fact that might 
reflect the generally negative rates of house price inflation prevailing over the period of study which 
may have generated a renewed concern with liquidity among house purchasers. House price inflation 
was subsequently included in the mortgage demand equation and those results are reported here. The 
results of estimating the housing demand equations can be found in Tables B1 to B3 in Appendix B 
which shows results for the whole sample and classified by choice of type of contract. 
Table 1 
There are a number of measurement issues involved in the research. BHPS respondents were asked for 
the value of their property on purchase, not for the current value. Both of these measures can be subject 
to measurement error though recollection of price paid should be less so. The purchase price of the 
property was corrected and expressed in real terms. The data contained no direct measure of the choice 
between fixed and variable rate debt. The choice was imputed from an algorithm, devised by the 
author, that inferred choice from observed periodic payment patterns. This imputed discrete choice was 
then corrected with a model used to detect classification error in the dependent variable. This procedure 
produces reliable and consistent estimates and is reported elsewhere (Leece, 2000 a, 2001 a). 
Econometric issues involved here are potential selection bias in the endowment/repayment mortgage 
choice and the possibility that the choice between fixed and variable rate mortgage debt is endogenous 
to mortgage demand. The results of tests to detect the presence and extent of these potential problems 
are reported in this paper.  
The choice between a fixed (FRM) and a variable rate mortgage (VRM) proved to be exogenously 
determined. This involved tests for selectivity and simultaneity. Having established this exogeneity  the 
estimated probability from a discrete choice model was used to measure the likely premium paid by an 
household taking up fixed rate debt (that is FRM rate – VRM rate). This was measured as the estimated 
probability of take up multiplied by the premium on five year fixed rate contracts. Thus those 
households with an higher probability of take up were hypothesised to be willing to pay a larger fixed 
rate premium, with the highest probability representing payment of the full five year cost. This measure 
was possible because the premium had no statistically significant effect on the choice between these 
two mortgage instruments a result established  elsewhere (Leece, 2000 a; 2001 a). The expected sign 
on this variable is negative  indicating lower cost instruments increase mortgage demand.  
The qualitative predictions tested in this paper relate to two major subsets of behaviour, under different 
interest rate regimes, established by Brueckner (1994). Brueckner’s work can also be considered as a 
test of joint hypothesis of saving and mortgage borrowing. The BHPS for 1995 has data on savings and 
some measures of wealth, though it is not always complete. In fact a sub sample of only 264 
observations for which there was complete wealth and savings data was available. Of these 51 were 
annuity mortgage holders and 174 endowment mortgage holders (39 had a mix or other types of 
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mortgage). This sample is too small and unrepresentative to directly infer any patterns in savings 
behaviour for the two groups of borrowers. In any case zero saving should not be interpreted literally as 
precautionary and other motives for saving will be present in addition to life cycle and portfolio effects. 
Thus the estimates in this paper relate to mortgage borrowing alone. 
One obvious response to attempts to detect debt maximisation behaviour is to suggest that econometric 
estimation is unnecessary. Mortgage debt of 100% of the value of the property, or very high loan to 
value ratios would indicate debt maximisation. Indeed reference to the descriptive statistics given in 
Table 1 indicates that endowment holders have significantly higher loan to value ratios. However, there 
are several problems with such a simplistic approach. Prudential lending rules vary by time, institution, 
individual and dominant lending rule (for example, loan to value ratio or multiples of income). The key 
issue is whether factors other than the instrument for housing expenditure determine mortgage demand. 
The sample of mortgage holders contains households at different stages of their life cycle. Thus some 
households will have equity arising from increases in property prices. Debt maximising borrowers 
would adjust their level of borrowing to withdraw this equity and finance current consumption. This 
may be limited by transactions costs and by lenders constraints on equity withdrawal at times of 
uncertain property prices, thus there will be some variations in gearing even for debt maximisers. 
The endowment involves the indirect payment of debt via a reverse annuity (based upon a bonus 
system) so that for any given loan to value ratio the actual net balance of capital owing is unobservable. 
So high loan to value ratios for endowment holders are deceptive and the equation using this variable 
should be interpreted with caution. However, variations in initial gearing can still reflect attitudes to 
risk and/or the substitution of mortgage debt for financial wealth. In addition the real mortgage balance 
at the point of house purchase acts as a proxy for the outstanding capital owed. If the rate of return on 
the endowment equals the rate of inflation then falls in real value will correspond with growth in the 
investment fund. In practice the return is expected to be higher than this but if all households are 
subject to the same degree of bias in estimation the coefficient estimates will be consistent. 
Econometric Estimates 
The econometric estimates relate to the two groups of borrowers. The results reported in Table 2 are 
demand estimates for repayment mortgage holders. It is expected that borrowers having an annuity 
/repayment mortgage will conform to the predictions for an impatient debt maximising household 
(subset 1 above). The results reported in Table 3 relate to the mortgage demand of joint 
borrowers/investors who are expected to hold intermediate levels of mortgage debt (subset 2 above), 
that is endowment mortgage holders. Table 2 and Table 3 report results using the log of the real 
mortgage balance at origination as the dependent variable. Where relevant, parameter estimates using 
the log of the loan to value ratio at origination as the dependent variable will be reported. Both of these 
dependent variables have been used in the literature to date (Cho et al, 1995; Follain and Dunsky, 
1997) and can provide complimentary interpretations of the phenomenon under investigation.  
There is a methodological problem with predicting zero coefficients. The reported statistical tests may 
Page 15 of 29
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
15 
 
not be of sufficient power to confirm the null hypothesis. This is worrying because the sample size for 
repayment mortgage holders is significantly smaller than that for endowment mortgage holders. To 
declare for the null hypothesis means that a Type II error might be committed. The best we can say is 
that the estimation suggests that the null hypothesis is correct, or that it has not been rejected. There are 
also arguments against applying power tests post hoc after the sample has been generated (Goodman 
and Berlin, 1994; Gerard et al, 1998; Hoenig and Heisey, 2001) so that this is not done in this case. It is 
legitimate to comment on the size of the estimates. Also, a stronger test concerns the collective 
significance of variables other than housing expenditure, which is a test of the restriction that the sum 
of these effects is zero. F tests for the restricted and unrestricted models are reported in Table 4 below.  
Table 2 
Table 3 
The estimates for annuity mortgage holders, in Table 2, are consistent with theoretical expectations for 
debt maxi misers. Most coefficients are not significantly different from zero, with low values. 
Moreover, the F tests of the restriction of zero coefficients on variables other than housing expenditure, 
reported in Table 4, indicate that the restriction holds in the annuity mortgage case, that is restricted 
and unrestricted models are not significantly different at the 5% level. This applies to both dependent 
variables. The lack of statistical significance at the 5% level of the log of housing expenditure, with the 
loan to value ratio as the dependent variable, can be tentatively interpreted as reflecting a binding 
borrowing constraint for these households. This constraint can vary by household, and desired 
borrowing levels are achieved through higher levels of housing expenditure. There is no evidence via 
household income of a binding loan to income ratio. 
There might be a prior expectation of heteroskedacticity in the estimation of absolute levels of 
mortgage demand for debt maxi misers, for example larger standard errors may emerge from higher 
levels of housing expenditure. This problem was slight and was largely removed by using the log form 
of the dependent variables, and controlling, by the use of a dummy variable, for those who borrowed 
small amounts for short durations.14 The dummy variable representing durations of less than 24 years 
was statistically significant and negative indicating low loan to value ratios of around 0.5. This result is 
consistent with a group of more patient non-savers for whom ms rr < , who wish to pay off expensive 
debt more quickly; and constitutes yet another subset of behaviour identified in Brueckner’s theoretical 
model.  Otherwise the generally positive association between debt size and maturity is suggestive of 
debt maximisation. The sample of shorter durations was too small to estimate the full model using this 
sub sample and results were sensitive to the cut off point used to create the dummy variable.  
The estimated mortgage demand for joint borrowers/investors reported in Table 3 provides an 
interesting contrast to the annuity mortgage results. The log of housing expenditure is statistically 
 
14 A robust White covariance matrix was estimated and standard errors where corrected but there was little 
difference in the estimates. Data visualisation of the distribution of errors against predicted values suggested a 
small but not serious degree of heteroskedasticity. 
Page 16 of 29
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
16 
 
significant at the 5% level. This also applies when using the loan to value ratio as the dependent 
variable. Thus there is some systematic influence of housing decisions on gearing for endowment 
mortgage holders. The elasticity of the real mortgage balance on log of housing expenditure is high at 
0.842. The estimated elasticity of the loan to value ratio is small at –0.158. However, the results offer 
some evidence for the absence of a binding constraint on gearing. The F test of the restricted and 
unrestricted models reported in Table 4 indicate that variables other than housing expenditure are 
collectively significant at the 5% level a result not consistent with the pure debt maximisation model. 
Table 4 
The sign on log of housing expenditure using the loan to value ratio for endowment mortgage holders 
as the dependent variable was negative. This is consistent with some previous US research (Chow et al 
1995). Housing expenditure can raise the risk profile of household portfolios (see Brueckner, 1997) and 
lower gearing compensates by facilitating hedging. Alternatively, if high levels of expenditure on 
housing are a proxy for wealth then there might be some substitution of non-housing wealth for 
mortgage debt (see Hendershott and Lemon, 1975; Jaffee and Rosen, 1979; Ioannides, 1989). 
However, some research finds a positive relationship between non-housing wealth and mortgage debt 
(Jones, 1994; Jones, 1995; Cho et al, 1995). The research reported in this paper has insufficient data to 
test the various joint hypotheses of investment and housing demand behaviour. Also, the research 
reported here treats the main mortgage for the purchase of property, further borrowing could reflect 
portfolio motives (see Jones, 1993, a; 1993 b; 1995) and should also be the subject of further work. 
The endowment mortgage estimates reveal two more variables statistically significant at the 5% level. 
These are the nominal mortgage interest rate and marital status. The mortgage interest rate has a 
negative sign, though the elasticity of demand is low at 0.2. Brueckner’s model is ambiguous with 
respect to the expected sign on the interest rate for this type of borrower. The negative sign is 
consistent with previous UK research. (see Leece, 2000 b)15. The estimated premium on fixed rate debt 
is negatively signed, but is only statistically significant at the 10% level. Marital status has a negative 
impact upon gearing a result consistent with treating this variable as a proxy for risk aversion and the 
likely higher propensity to save of married households. 
The results of this research contrast with previous UK work. Leece (2000 b) estimated mortgage 
demand by mortgage choice, for 1980 to 1986, with the aim of detecting the impact of financial 
deregulation. The results of that research, published in this journal, revealed endowment mortgage 
holders to be motivated by real mortgage interest rates. Income was also a significant explanatory 
variable in the demand for mortgage debt by annuity mortgage holders. The early 1990s provide an 
interesting contrast to this period. Negative equity for many households added to borrowers uncertainty 
and they may have adopted a more cautious view of gearing. However, for both periods there are clear 
and significant differences in the mortgage demand equation of holders of these two types of mortgage 
 
15 The paremeter estimates for the mortgage demand of endowment mortgage holders presented by Leece (2004) 
differ slightly from those presented here. This arises from some differences in the specification. For example, the 
inclusion of house price inflation in the actual mortgage demand equation discussed here. 
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instrument. Thus there is some evidence of continuing separating equilibrium in the United Kingdom 
mortgage market based on non varying contractual features. 
A number of specification tests were conducted to test the robustness, consistency and efficiency of the 
econometric estimates. The repayment/endowment choice was modelled using a probit equation, and a 
selectivity equation estimated. The inverse mills ratio was not significant in either mortgage demand 
equation (probability 0.70 annuity, 0.78 endowment). A mover (endowment) /stayer (annuity) model 
controlling for possible endogenous selectivity (e.g. on the mortgage interest rate) was also estimated. 
This exercise was not successful in that satisfactory convergence of the algorithm was not achieved. 
This could reflect either or both the extensive use of dummy variables, or the low explanatory value 
(pseudo R2=0.01) and poor predictive ability of the auxiliary selection equation (only 1 repayment 
mortgage choice was predicted correctly). Other research utilising the UK endowment/repayment 
mortgage choice has found no evidence of such selectivity bias in a mortgage demand equation (see 
Devereaux and Lanot. 2004)16. These results support the treatment of the holders of the two mortgage 
instruments as segmented groups of borrowers. 
A Hausmann test of endogeneity, using the residual from the housing expenditure equation as a 
regressor in the mortgage demand equation suggested the simultaneous determination of housing and 
mortgage demand (see Smith and Blundell, 1986). This was the case for all the models tested. 
Selectivity test for the endogeneity of the fixed/variable rate mortgage choice indicated that this was an 
exogenous influence for both categories of borrower. This result is also consistent with previous UK 
research (see Leece, 2001 b). The estimates were also robust to a number of different specifications of 
the user cost of owner occupation variable (e.g. different lags on the rate of house price inflation), and 
different means of specifying the estimated fixed rate premium paid17. For endowment estimates the 
statistical significance of the mortgage interest rate variable is not robust to excluding the discrepancy 
between savings and mortgage rates. Though the latter was not statistically significant at the 5% level 
the impact of changes in mortgage costs might be expected to be greater when the discrepancy is less, 
thus the need to control for this factor. The nominal interest rate effect also looses significance when 
house price inflation is excluded from the estimating equation. This suggests the importance of the real 
rate of interest for this group, but the coefficients on house price inflation and mortgage cost are not 
sufficiently close, in this case, to support a user cost based argument of mortgage demand. 
 
16 Models incorporating switching regressions were not generally successful with convergence proving difficult. 
These models involve a two stage least squares estimation of the two mortgage demand equations with the 
switching based on predicted probabilities generated by the probit on endowment choice (this can also be 
exogenously or endogenously modelled). Given the different nature of the mortgage balances in each equation 
(that is endowments carrying mortgage debt to maturity) then in any case it might not be legitimate to conduct a 
two stage least squares regression on these two choices.  
17 The final measure used was the probability of selecting fixed rate debt multiplied by the premium where the 
probability of selection was greater than  0.5. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has reported the results from estimating the mortgage demand of households who are argued 
to face different opportunity costs of equity in their property. This difference facilitated a test of the 
qualitative results of Brueckner’s theoretical model of mortgage demand. In particular it was possible 
to test for those circumstances were mortgage debt might be maximised and the conditions under which 
the household used their own savings to finance the purchase of a property. The research identified a 
group of mortgage holders likely to be mortgage maxi misers with zero saving in an alternative 
investment to housing (repayment mortgage holders), and borrowers who were likely to demand an 
intermediate size of mortgage debt (endowment mortgage holders). A comparison of the parameter 
estimates of mortgage demand equations, for the two types of borrower, confirmed this predicted 
difference in behaviour. This allowed a true test of the theoretical model whose predicted results 
critically depended upon the relationship between borrowing and savings rates. This was also the first 
cross section tests of the simultaneity of housing and mortgage demand using United Kingdom data 
and was an important update and improvement of previous mortgage demand estimates reported in this 
journal. 
Various specification tests were conducted on the estimates to test for robustness, selectivity and 
simultaneity. Housing and mortgage demand were simultaneously determined though this may reflect 
constrained debt maximisation in the case of repayment mortgage holders and wider portfolio 
considerations in the case of endowment mortgage holders. There was no evidence of selectivity bias in 
estimating mortgage demand by mortgage type and the choice between a fixed rate and a variable rate 
mortgage appeared also to be an exogenous and not very significant influence. 
There are some interesting comparisons with US research. Given the argument that the opportunity cost 
of equity in property is higher than the net of tax mortgage interest rate in the United States (Ling and 
McGill, 1998), then the relevant comparison is with the mortgage demand of endowment holders. Both 
US and UK studies confirm the simultaneity of mortgage and housing demand. The estimates of the 
interest rate elasticity of mortgage demand differ. Follain and Dunsky (1997) find an interest rate 
elasticity of -1.00 to –1.5 compared to the estimate here of 0.2. This may be less in the UK because of 
the lack of simultaneous determination of mortgage demand and mortgage instrument choice, or may 
reflect the size of discrepancies between opportunity cost and the net of tax mortgage interest rate. 
Income is not statistically significant in the UK equations as it generally is in the US (see Ling and 
McGill, 1998). Also, though a comparison of estimates based upon instruments must be tentative the 
housing expenditure variable in US studies can be significantly larger (see Follain and Dunsky, 1997).  
Regardless of the housing finance system concerned the paper does establish the need to identify the 
key subsets of mortgage borrowers classified by expected behaviour. This is important both for the 
evaluation of the impact of fiscal and monetary policy, and rigorous housing and mortgage market 
analysis. Future research within national housing finance systems, and with richer sources of financial 
data, may have more success identifying market segmentation by estimating switching regressions, 
with either exogenous or endogenous determinants of selectivity.  
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1 
The Behavioural Basis of Endowment Choice 
 
N=689   Log Likelihood= -381.5970 Restricted Log 
Likelihood= -383.8374! 
 
Dependent Variable Endowment=1 
Variable Coefficient t-value 
Log(Income)  -0.0121    -0.187 
Log(Age)   -0.0608        -0.390 
Log(Mortgage Rate)**  0.4513        2.020 
Log(Housing) -0.0004    -0.896 
Chi Squared= 4.480693  Significance Level= 0.2140189 
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Appendix B 
Table B1 
Estimation of the Instrument for Housing Demand 
(Aggregate Estimates) 
N= 744 R2=0.3298 
Variable Coefficient t-value 
Constant* 7.4322   
14.001 
Log(Age)   0.0486   0 .747 
Log(Income) * 0.3105   9.683 
Child under 5 years of age     0.0819   1.389 
Male    0.0171   0 .435 
Married *      0.2388 6.258 
South East*  0.4901 8.758 
South West *  0.4457   5.589 
Midlands*   0.2662 3.984 
Northwest*   0.3129  4.072 
Yorkshire**    0.1778 2.339 
North     0.0054 0.065 
East Anglia*   0.2389 2.343 
Log(Mortgage rate) -0.1757 -1.417  
House price inflation 0.0023 0.181 
Log(savings rate-mortgage 
rate) 
 0.4138  2.041 
* Sig at 1% level   ** Sig at 5% level 
Table B2 
Estimation of the Instrument for Housing Demand 
(Repayment Estimates) 
N=167                                         R2=0.3239 
Variable Coefficient t-value 
Constant*  9.8964 5.499 
Log(Age)    -0.3082   -1.553 
Log(Income)*    0.3152 4.116 
Child under 5 years of age -0.0869    -0.729 
Male   -0.0129 -1.373 
Married*       0.3850   3.904 
Southeast*  0.3714 2.653 
Southwest**   0.4772 2.458 
Midlands  0.2849     1.624 
Northwest  0.1610 0.699 
Yorkshire    0.2895  1.567 
North   -0.3107 -1.063 
Eastanglia   0.2067     0.824 
Log(Mortage Rate) -0.5342  -1.248 
Log(savingsrate-mortgage 
rate) 
-0.0258    -0.050 
Fixed rate premium -0.1245 -
1.082 
* Sig at 1% level   ** Sig at 5% level 
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Table B3 
Estimation of the Instrument for Housing Demand 
(Endowment Estimates) 
N=508    R2=0.3757 
Variable Coefficient t-value 
Constant*  7.4164 9.073 
Log(Age)   0.1260   1.313 
Log(Income)*   0.2669    7.789 
Child under 5 years of age **    0.1479   2.148 
Male     0.0645    1.531 
Married  *     0.2255    5.652 
Southeast * 0.5442    9.131 
Southwest *  0.3613   4.260 
Midlands*   0.2788 4.061 
Northwest*   0.3295 4.199 
Yorkshire    0.1269 1.603 
North     0.0798     0.984 
East  Anglia   0.1818 1.753 
Log(Mortgage rate) -0.0947    -0.490 
Log(savings rate-mortgage 
rate) 
 0.3064  1.404 
LOGDPPRE  0.0520     .935 
* Sig at 1% level   ** Sig at 5% level 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Annuity Mortgage Endowment Mortgage All of Sample 
Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Real 
Mortgage 
Balance 
46277.55      31956.04      Real 
Mortgage 
Balance 
46403.92 22244.74 Real 
Mortgage 
Balance 
46372.65 24974.69
Loan to 
Value ratio 
0.70      0.28 Loan to 
Value ratio 
0.81 0.20 Loan to 
Value ratio 
0.78      0.22     
Age of 
reference 
person 
34.24 11.35 Age of 
reference 
person 
33.84   10.16 Age of 
reference 
person 
33.94    10.46      
Mortgage 
rate 
9.42 1.91 Mortgage 
rate 
9.77 1.98 Mortgage 
rate 
9.68      1.97
Fixed rate 
premium 
0.76 0.29 Fixed rate 
premium 
0.74 0.29 Fixed rate 
premium 
0.74 0.29    
Savings 
rate-
mortgage 
rate 
2.26 0.26 Savings 
rate-
mortgage 
rate 
2.22 0.26 Savings 
rate-
mortgage 
rate 
2.23     0.26      
Gross 
household 
income 
9.63 0.63      Gross 
household 
income 
9.62 0.59    Gross 
household 
income 
9.62 0.60     
Housing 
Expenditure 
75655.60 52869.30 Housing 
Expenditure 
62289.55 44249.68 Housing 
Expenditure 
65596.40 46846.76
Child less 
than 5 years 
of age 
0.17      0.38 Child less 
than 5 years 
of age 
0.09 0.28 Child less 
than 5 years 
of age 
0.11     0.31     
Male 0.59 0.49 Male 0.68      .47      Male 0.66      0.48     
Married 0.40 0.49 Married 0.54     0.50 Married 0.50      0.50     
House price 
inflation 
-0.17 1.73 House price 
inflation 
-0.31     1.56 House price 
inflation 
-0.28     1.60    
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Table 2 
Mortgage Demand Estimation: Debt Maximisation (Repayment 
Mortgage Holders) 
N= 167 
Dependent Variable = Log (Real Mortgage Balance) 
R2=0.320 
Variable  Coefficient t-value 
Constant 0.373            0.128
Log (Age) 0.052      0.275 
LOG(Mortgage rate) 0.279      0.710  
LOG(Fixed rate premium) 0.144 1.403 
LOG(Savings rate-mortgage rate) 0.304 0.707   
LOG(Income) 0.072 0.755 
LOG(Housing) 0.799 3.531 
Child under 5 years of age 0.092 -0.908
Male -0.119 -1.399 
Married -0.191      -1.489
House price inflation 0.015 0.635   
Duration<24 years. -0.518 -6.348
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Table 3 
 Mortgage Demand Estimation (Intermediate Borrowers and Savers: 
Endowment Mortgage Holders) 
N=508 
Dependent Variable = Log (Real Mortgage Balance) 
R2=0.6136 
Variable  Coefficient t-value 
Constant  1.849 2.752
Log (Age) -0.079 -1.179 
LOG(Mortgage rate) -0.293 -2.059 
LOG(Fixed rate premium) -0.063 -1.609
LOG(Savings rate-mortgage rate) -0.205 -1.312 
LOG(Household income) 0.045 1.358
LOG(Housing) 0.842      12.146 
Children under 5 years of age 0.047 0.964   
Male 0.016 0.533      
Married -0.107      -3.394   
House price inflation -0.012 -1.305
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Table4 
A Comparison of the Restricted and Unrestricted Models: Regression Diagnostics 
(Real Mortgage Balance Estimates) 
Diagnostics Subset 1 Annuity Mortgage 
Holders 
Subset 2 Endowment Mortgage 
Holders 
F Statistic 0.2768 2.4574
Probability 0.5996 0.0096
Restricted Model Log 
Likelihood 
-171.2195 -358.4519
Unrestricted Model Log 
Likelihood 
-113.4292 -111.3849
This table reports the results of testing the restriction that a subset of variables have zero collective 
impact upon the absolute real size of mortgage debt. In the case of the annuity mortgage both the 
instrument for housing expenditure and the dummy variable for duration< 24 years are assumed to have 
non zero parameter estimates. 
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